Lessons learned on initiating networked innovation by Deken, F. et al.
VU Research Portal
Lessons learned on initiating networked innovation
Deken, F.; Lauche, Kristina; Berends, Hans; Gemser, Gerda
2016
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
CC BY
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Deken, F., Lauche, K., Berends, H., & Gemser, G. (2016). Lessons learned on initiating networked innovation.
Delft University of Technology.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 22. May. 2021
Lessons Learned on Initiating 
Networked Innovation2
Fleur Deken,  Kristina Lauche,  Hans Berends & Gerda Gemser
Fleur Deken











Chair Organizational Development and Design 
Radboud University Nijmegen
Nijmegen School of Management
6500 HK Nijmegen
The Netherlands
t: +31 24 361 17 36
m: +31 646 343 441
e: k.lauche@fm.ru.nl






In today’s competitive markets, tech com-
panies must innovate to excel in the long 
term. A survey from the Boston Consulting 
Group (2009) showed that the majority of 
senior executives from large international 
corporations have innovation amongst 
their top three strategic priorities. To real-
ize ambitious innovation goals, companies 
increasingly tap into knowledge and ca-
pabilities of other companies. They set up 
alliances and R&D consortia both within 
and across supply chains to keep up with 
fast-paced technology and market de-
velopments and realize new product and 
service innovations. Such collaborations 
are types of ‘networked innovation,’ which 
we define as the pooling of resources by 
three or more firms for innovation purpos-
es. By pooling knowledge and capabilities 
companies can exploit their complemen-
tarities. Despite the potential benefits of 
networked innovation, organizations that 
initiate these projects face many challeng-
es: Partners’ goals are often ill aligned, 
technologies may prove incompatible, 
and roles and responsibilities are unclear 
at the start. The challenges become even 
more stringent when companies further 
deviate from their existing supply chain 
roles (e.g., when OEMs ally horizontally 
with existing suppliers or when partner-
ships are set up across sectors). 
This document reports on the lessons 
learned on initiating networked innova-
tion based on the doctoral research of 
Fleur Deken. We focus specifically on the 
initiation process since scant research 
hitherto has studied this process. Our 
research was part of a larger program 
on networked innovation funded by NL 
Agency of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(Agentschap NL). Thirteen researchers 
from different Dutch universities investi-
gated types of networked innovation in 
industry. The lessons discussed below are 
grounded in our ethnographic research 
but are also supported by research at 
other companies and published academic 
research.
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1. The Nature of Networked Innovation
Our fieldwork took place in the automo-
tive industry and is a typical example of 
a product–service innovation. Increas-
ingly, OEMs build new business models 
around hybrid offerings or combinations 
between existing physical products 
such as cars and new, to-be-developed 
information-based services. A Bain & 
Company study reports that only 21% of 
OEMs’ attempts to introduce—even the 
simplest—product–service combinations 
are successful. It seems that “[m]any prod-
uct companies don’t realize the distance 
that separates a services expansion from 
their core product business, leading them 
to underestimate the difficulties and the 
degree of difficulty and investment re-
quired to build a strong services business” 
(Baveja, Gilbert, & Ledingham, 2004, p. 4).
A recent study in the Journal of Market-
ing reported that to realize successful 
product–service combinations, organiza-
tions must identify and exploit synergies 
between products and services (Ulaga & 
Reinartz, 2011). However, traditional prod-
uct development capabilities differ from 
service development capabilities. Because 
services have a number of process char-
acteristics, existing product development 
capabilities are of limited use when 
developing product–services systems. 
Services, for instance, are co-produced 
by customers, are perishable, intangible, 
produced and consumed simultaneously, 
and heterogeneous (Trott, 2011). This 
leaves OEMs with a challenge: they cannot 
simply apply their existing product devel-
opment capability to the development 
of product–service systems, nor can they 
simply import and apply partner organi-
zations’ service development capabilities. 
Marketing product–service combinations 
for instance requires developing new sales 
capabilities for both service- and the prod-
uct-centric firms (Ulaga & Reinartz, 2011). 
Therefore, what is required to succeed in 
developing successful product–service 
combinations, is a novel capability that 
connects products and services to lever-
age the potential complementarities.   
In our research, we identified two work 
processes at OEMs and their potential 
partners that influence innovators in 
initiating networked innovation projects: 
New Product Development and Procure-
ment processes. We focus on these two 
processes for the following reasons. First, 
these processes feature prominently in 
most innovations where multiple parties 
collaborate. Second, in our ethnograph-
ic research, we found that these work 
processes greatly influenced the progress 
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in the Connected Truck program. Although 
we here only discuss the New Product 
Development and Procurement process-
es, possibly also other work processes 
impact networked innovation in similar 
ways. We will demonstrate that these 
two work processes are often grounded 
in ‘old’ logics that no longer apply in the 
context of networked innovation. Below 
we unpack the unique characteristics of 
networked innovation programs and dis-
cuss how these challenge existing ways of 
managing innovation. In the next section, 
we describe ways of dealing with these 
challenges.
2. Challenges
2.1. New Product Development 
processes
First, since networked innovation pro-
grams go beyond the knowledge bases 
of individual companies in the network, 
no single company can fully specify the 
program. Cooper’s Stage Gates process, 
the archetype upon which most compa-
nies’ new product development processes 
were built, does not allow for a specifi-
cation process that spans organizational 
boundaries. Rather, internal projects are 
evaluated based upon the completeness 
of specifications and can often only pro-
ceed to the next Gate when the product 
specification is completed.  
Second, exploiting complementarities be-
tween products and services is challeng-
ing since both incumbent product-centric 
firms and their network partners have yet 
to develop such capabilities. Therefore, 
multiple iterations are required to develop 
successful product–service systems. 
Often, novel business models are required 
to market product–service innovations. 
The academic literature on business 
model innovation advises companies to 
experiment with offerings and models. 
McGrath (2010) for instance maintains 
that companies should follow a ‘discov-
ery-oriented approach’ rather than an 
analytical approach (e.g., analyzing the 
competitive environment using manage-
ment tools such as Porter’s Five Forces or 
the SWOT analysis) to learn about which 
offerings and models work and which 
do not. Discovery-oriented approaches 
are needed that enable experimentation 
in the marketplace to discern successful 
new models. New product development 
models, however, typically penalize 
experimentation. Rather, these models 
follow a one-off logic—companies should 
get everything right before launching 
the product. In subsequent steps in the 
innovation funnel, the product or service 
should become increasingly concrete and 
crystallized. Service-centric companies 
are practiced in continuous learning 
processes but their methods have not 
yet been coalesced in structured models 
like the Stage Gate model (see also Trott, 
2011). Although products and services 
clearly differ, the few existing new service 
development models are criticized for 
resembling Stage Gate models.
2.2. Procurement processes
Adhering to the procurement logic is 
challenging when initiating a networked 
innovation project. Traditional procure-
ment processes are directed at selecting 
suppliers rather than initiating new 
partnerships. For instance, procurement 
processes prescribe that only after an 
innovation program is fully specified, the 
official procurement process can start. 
In other words, companies should first 
decide upon their strategy before starting 
the procurement process. Slowinski’s 
(2003) popular “Want, Find, Get, Manage” 
model is built upon such a linear step-by-
step approach. It prescribes that firms 
should first identify ‘what’ goals they 
want to achieve; then ‘find’ the required 
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external resources; ‘get’ a new collabo-
ration partner; and finally ‘manage’ the 
collaboration to realize their goals. Yet, it 
is difficult for companies to precisely know 
‘what’ they want before they actually 
‘see’ the opportunities potential partners’ 
capabilities can bring. Especially when the 
envisioned innovation braches away from 
core capabilities and expertise, knowing 
‘what’ to want is difficult—let alone to 
fully specify it in requirements.
Second, procurement processes often fol-
low a best value logic. Different potential 
partners or suppliers are compared and 
ranked based on their scores on prede-
termined requisites. This logic is also typ-
ically associated with selecting suppliers 
rather than business partners. By sending 
out ‘Requests for Information’ and later 
‘Requests for Proposals,’ companies 
collect information upon which they rank 
and select partners. Yet, when no single 
organization can fully specify the program 
themselves, who selects who becomes ob-
fuscated and the traditional role division 
where the OEM takes the lead is difficult to 
maintain. Furthermore, the literature on 
alliances and joint ventures advises to se-
lect partners also based on softer criteria 
such as ‘cultural fit’ and ‘trust’. Procure-
ment processes based on the best value 
logic may have trouble incorporating such 
qualitative concepts since they mostly rely 
on quantitative indicators. 
Third, in networked innovation project, 
per definition, more than two organiza-
tions ally. Product–service systems are 
not simple additions of well-bounded 
modules with predefined interfaces but, 
rather, are built around complex, ill-de-
fined dependencies between partners’ 
capabilities. Traditional procurement 
processes are unsuitable for dealing with 
such dependencies between potential 
partners. 
Which partner should be selected first? 
Which criteria allow for incorporating the 
interrelations between partners? Even 
though decision makers may find one 
partner (slightly) more suited compared 
to others, the ‘fit’ with other network 
partners can change this preference alto-
gether. Traditional procurement processes 
cannot determine which combination of 
network partners will add most value; tra-
ditional procurement processes artificially 
slice and dice the dependencies between 
potential partners—thereby reducing 
complexity but not taking a comprehen-
sive perspective on what matters most: 
ensuring a successful collaborations 
between network partners. 
Finally, since potential partners all bring 
their unique capabilities to the network, 
the innovation program’s content is partly 
dependent on which partners eventually 
enter the network. This further compli-
cates objectively comparing and ranking 
partners separately. Therefore, several 
iterations between specifying the program 
content and matching the network 
partners is required to identify a network 
that can deliver both (partners’) strategic 
objectives and comprises a compatible set 
of partners.
3. Dealing with the Challenges: Lessons 
Learned
#1 Defining the program strategy 
through early interactions
The intricate dependencies between 
partner capabilities make specifying the 
program a joint activity rather than the 
responsibility of a single company in the 
future network. During early interac-
tions, deep discussions are needed to 
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collaboratively scrutinize initial hunches 
on complementarities between products 
and services and business models. Based 
on our research, we came to call this 
process collective envisioning. Collective 
envisioning is the process though which 
potential network partners develop a 
shared vision of what the program will 
look like. Through recurrent interactions 
between potential partners, potential 
partners share their initial ideas, or, in 
other words, how they envision the future 
program. Over time, the emerging net-
work can develop a congruent, shared set 
of goals, requirements, and early solutions 
for the program
During interactions, potential partners 
fill each other’s knowledge gaps. This is a 
first important step in understanding the 
complementarities between divergent 
capabilities. Especially when the program 
deviates further from the company’s own 
competencies, they may be surprised by 
input from potential partners. As a result 
of this surprising input, goals, require-
ments, and solutions may be transformed 
during interactions with potential 
partners early on in the initiation process. 
Furthermore, during such interactions the 
assumptions upon which the program is 
build and the program’s potential can be 
validated. Potential partners have their 
own knowledge and experience and can 
use this to scrutinize the program content. 
Especially when various potential partners 
confirm the relevance of for instance the 
program proposition, this increases the 
confidence in the program. Therefore, 
through collective envisioning innovators 
can strategically strengthen and validate 
their proposition by drawing upon the 
collective knowledge of their potential 
partners. Innovators can use this confir-
mation to internally sell the program—this 
will be further discussed in lesson #4.
# 2 Influencing and untangling
Because of this collective envisioning, 
potential partners can (partially) influ-
ence the OEMs strategy development. 
Although this may happen in traditional 
buyer–supplier relations, it is more likely 
in networked innovation programs. Since 
in these programs the (potential) network 
partners all go beyond their own knowl-
edge bases, the potential for knowledge 
cross-fertilization and identifying radically 
new solutions increases. By for instance 
introducing new solutions into the discus-
sion, potential partners can (try to) steer 
the program’s direction into a favorable 
direction for themselves.
This opportunity, however, simultaneous-
ly imposes a challenge for potential part-
ner organizations: they may be confronted 
with sudden and abrupt changes in a 
program’s direction and scope. First, since 
all potential partners will try influence the 
OEMs program strategy, it is likely that 
after a series of interactions with different 
partners, the program strategy has 
changed. Second, since such programs are 
associated with high levels of uncertainty, 
the changes in project direction and scope 
can be abrupt and radical. In our research, 
we found that potential partners were 
oftentimes surprised by the (seemingly) 
abrupt changes in scope and direction. 
Potential partners can only partially mit-
igate these uncertainties. By interacting 
regularly with the OEM (and other po-
tential network partners), they can try to 
keep up with the latest developments in 
the strategy formulation of the program. 
At the same time, the OEM may struggle 
to oversee how the capabilities and inputs 
of the various potential partner organi-
zations amount to a complete program 
specification and how the potential part-
ners match the envisioned network roles. 
For instance, in some network scenarios 
one company may fulfill two roles simulta-
neously whereas in other scenarios three 
separate companies fulfill that same role. 
Untangling the complexity introduced by 
interdependent capabilities and roles is a 
key challenge when initiating networked 
innovation. Potential partner organiza-
tions can support this process by explor-
ing interrelations between themselves 
and other potential network partners. Yet 
it is unlikely that OEMs will leave a central 
role in the network to other partners. 
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# 3 Early interactions as initial perfor-
mance and fit indicators of potential 
partners
Since OEMs may start interacting with 
potential partners when only having 
completed a rough program specification, 
their ideas on who they consider a suit-
able partner may fluctuate considerably 
over time. During the early interactions, 
potential partners not only co-develop the 
program content—also their preference 
for certain partners will start to develop. 
After engaging with various potential 
partners, initial preferences may change 
altogether. In early stages of a networked 
innovation program, knowing what type 
of partner innovators want is tough. As 
a result, the criteria for evaluating the 
potential partners co-evolve alongside 
the process of early interactions. Potential 
partners therefore cannot rely too much 
on early feedback on their performance.
As was stated above, cultural fit and trust 
between future network partners are 
determinants of successful collabora-
tions. Early interactions are a means to 
experience to what extent the potential 
network partners experience a trustful 
(potential) relation and how they evaluate 
the cultural fit between themselves and 
the potential partners. 
By interacting bilaterally with various po-
tential partners, people may get an initial 
feel for the complementarities between 
themselves and their potential partners. 
Facilitating interactions between (poten-
tially) dependent network partners, the 
process of determining complementary 
capabilities may speed up the process of 
exploring combinations of different part-
ners. Further, such interactions may also 
provide an initial insight into the cultural 
fit and level of trust between dependent 
network partners.
#4 Legitimizing the program internally
For both OEMs and potential partner 
organizations it takes substantial effort 
to persuade their internal organizations 
to accept the ideas developed in early 
interactions. As in most innovation pro-
grams, and even more so in networked 
innovation programs, other organizational 
stakeholders may consider the innovation 
‘illegitimate’ (van Dijk, Berends, Jelinek, 
Romme, & Weggeman, 2011), i.e. they 
consider the program either ‘impossible’ 
or ‘undesirable’. These stakeholders may 
concern both people from other depart-
ments and a company’s senior manage-
ment. The outcomes of the collective 
envisioning with potential partners will 
be confronted with the strategies at the 
various participating organizations. The 
innovators need to, somehow, convince 
other stakeholders of the potential of 
their ideas (Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, 
& Lawrence, 2001; Lauche, 2011). Not 
the least, they have to convince their 
respective Top Management Teams (TMT) 
to support the program and allocate 
resources accordingly. The further away 
the envisioned program moves from the 
respective business-as-usual settings of 
the participating organizations, the more 
the program’s success depends on inter-
nal processes of legitimizing. Legitimizing 
is the act of weaving the content and 
actions associated with the networked 
innovation program into established 
concepts and processes (adapted from 
van Dijk, Berends, Jelinek, Romme, & We-
ggeman, 2011). Ensuring TMT support is 
particularity important. When this support 
lacks or disappears, program resources 
will become scarce. Academic literature, 
however, indicates that innovators in 
established organizations needs some de-
gree of autonomy in developing successful 
new innovations (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). 
Furthermore, when programs receive too 
much attention of the TMT, the progress 
of innovation programs may lag behind 
(Deken & Lauche, forthcoming). Therefore, 
there seems to be a trade-off between 
ensuring TMT support and managing their 
involvement.
In our research we found that the future 
network organizations were often un-
aware of each other’s internal legitimizing 
activities. Since the internal legitimacy 
of the program determines both the pro-
grams’ progress and allocated resources, 
network partners should try to gain as 
much insight as possible in the unfolding 
of these internal processes. Otherwise, 
they may be surprised by unexpected 
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shifts in course or get stuck because of 
insufficient resources.
#4.1 Embedding
Above we described that some estab-
lished work processes such as traditional 
procurement processes are unsuited 
for deciding about network partners. 
However, based on our research, we 
conclude that it may be difficult to ignore 
these processes altogether. OEMs, EMs, 
and other corporations that often ally 
with OEMs are all accustomed to the 
tendering logic that constitutes traditional 
procurement processes. These processes, 
for instance, define the respective roles 
and responsibilities of potential network 
partners. OEMs usually take a leading role 
and start specifying the project content. 
Although OEMs cannot fully maintain this 
role in networked innovation, they will 
probably still rely on their experience in 
initiating more traditional buyer–supplier 
relations—not least because OEMs’ pur-
chasing departments may insist following 
and that potential partners will also enact 
their role accordingly. 
Even though it may seem best to dismiss 
existing work processes, we found that 
when the involved innovators tried to do 
so, the innovation programs’ progress 
hampered. Innovators had to embed 
their actions in the very processes that 
essentially are unfit for networked inno-
vation. Embedding concerns molding the 
networked innovation activities in the ex-
isting work processes of the individual or-
ganizations. For instance, OEMs may have 
to mold the networked innovation actions 
into the Stage Gate processes as this assist 
in convincing internal stakeholders and 
the TMT of the relevance and accuracy of 
their actions. However, following the offi-
cial processes will only get innovators so 
far. The existing routines have to be adapt-
ed to deal with the unique characteristics 
of networked innovation. 
Adapting existing work processes is 
not uncommon in organizations—each 
program will do things slightly different. 
However, when dealing with developing 
product–services systems, different busi-
ness units and departments are involved. 
We found in our research that especially 
work processes that span departments 
are difficult to adjust. When handing over 
work to different department, people 
at that department expect the work in a 
certain way—in a certain format or order. 
These formats are usually tailored to other 
intradepartmental routines. When the 
formats deviate too much, internal stake-
holders from other departments have 
difficulty continuing the work handed over 
to them from the innovators. Alternatively, 
stakeholders may interpret the changes 
made to the work processes as simply 
‘poor program management’. 
The success of embedding activities de-
pends on how well innovators are able to 
maneuver within the bandwidth between 
(1) making small or limited changes to the 
existing work processes so that involved 
people from other departments can still 
effectively deal with the work that inno-
vators hand over to them and (2) making 
the necessary changes to work processes 
to incorporate the novelty associated with 
networked innovation program.
Embedding, however, not only concerns 
molding activities into existing process-
es just once. The timing and frequency 
of embedding activities matters too. 
Because the program is initially ill defined, 
the content is likely to change after 
sequences of early interacting with po-
tential partners. When innovators do not 
update internal stakeholders about these 
changes, the gap between what these 
stakeholders are expecting and the actual 
program content they will be confronted 
with at some point, may become too large 
to bridge. Frequent updating therefore 
is recommended. However, shifting the 
program’s course too often will also neg-
atively impact the programs’ legitimacy. 
Therefore, the success of embedding 
activities depends on how well innova-
tors maneuver between two conflicting 
principles. On the one hand, innovators 
should minimizing the gap between what 
stakeholders know and the most up-to-
date version of the program’s content, 
which requires frequently communicating 
changes to internal stakeholders. On the 
other hand, innovators should refrain 
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from communicating changes too fre-
quently since this will make the program 
seem unfocused and poorly managed.
#4.2 Translating
Developing product–service systems often 
yield new concepts and terminology. 
When concepts are completely new to the 
organization they may seem illegitimate. 
We found that innovators can deal with 
these illegitimacies by translating.
In translating, innovators present novel 
concepts as resembling the familiar; they 
assimilate new concepts associated with 
the innovation program to known con-
cepts. For instance by drawing analogies 
between new and existing concepts, inno-
vators can help internal stakeholders to 
better understand the program—making 
the program content resemble ‘busi-
ness-as-usual programs’ per definition 
supports its legitimacy. 
However, rendering the novel similar 
to the known has obvious limitations: if 
the program would truly resemble the 
familiar, it would not be a radical innova-
tion program. Therefore, the translation 
strategy can only work to a certain extent. 
It makes sense for innovators to develop 
a repertoire of analogies to draw upon 
in conversations with different internal 
stakeholders. The risk of this approach is 
however that by assimilating the novel 
to the known, the expectation regarding 
the innovation also changes. Research in 
innovation management identified that 
one of the key problems is that innova-
tion programs require for instance new 
approaches rather than being judged 
against existing yardsticks. For instance, 
“[e]stablished metrics make new projects 
look unattractive and artificially inflate 
the attractiveness of the existing busi-
ness” (McGrath, 2011).
4. Conclusion
To conclude, all (future) network partners 
must learn to deal with the uncertainty 
associated with networked innovation 
projects. All partners should be open 
towards learning from each other during 
early interactions to make the most of 
the collective envisioning process. The 
roles and responsibilities in interactions 
between OEMs and potential partners 
must be adapted accordingly. For OEMs, 
for instance, closely adhering to a ‘partner 
selection’ logic is unproductive. Potential 
partners should ensure they ‘sell’ their 
capabilities but also expect the focus of 
the program to shift over time. Potential 
partners should try to ‘think along’ and 
provide input to the collective envisioning 
process—not the least because this will 
influence how other partners evaluate 
their capabilities. All parties should be 
sufficiently flexible in letting go earlier 
ideas, requirements, and solutions since 
the collective envisioning is essentially 
iterative. Only by engaging in multiple 
rounds of exploring how to combine 
individual capabilities can the network 
identify complementarity. 
Selling the program internally is nontriv-
ial—both to other internal stakeholders 
and the TMT. Although all innovation 
programs are associated with illegitima-
cies, networked innovation programs even 
more so since they span inter- and in-
traorganizational boundaries. Selling the 
networked innovation program requires 
innovators to be inventive. They need to 
make existing work processes, concepts, 
and terminology work in their advantage. 
However, no one solution fits all. Rather, 
innovators need to use their empathetic 
abilities to tailor their translations and 
embedding to different organizational 
stakeholders.
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journals such as Design Studies, Journal of Engineering Design, Research in Engineering 
Design, and International Journal of Innovation and Technology Management. Fleur 
presented papers at international conferences on management and organization such as 
the Academy of Management Conference, the Process Research in Organization Studies 
Conference, and the European Group of Organizational Studies Colloquium. In 2013 Fleur 
received the Best Reviewer prize at the Academy of Management Meeting at the Strategy 
Activities and Practices (SAP) Interest Group in Lake Buena Vista (Orlando), US.
Prof.dr. Kristina Lauche
Kristina Lauche holds the chair of Organizational Development 
and Design at Radboud University Nijmegen since 2010. She held 
research and teaching positions at the University of Munich, the 
Swiss Federal Institute for Technology Zurich (ETH), the Univer-
sity of Aberdeen, and Delft University of Technology, and was a 
visiting researcher at the Centre of Activity Theory in Helsinki and 
at Technion in Israel. Prior to joining Nijmegen School of Manage-
ment, Kristina Lauche was appointed as Antoni van Leeuwenhoek 
professor for Organization Studies of Innovation at Delft University 
of Technology. Her research addresses planned and unplanned forms of organizational 
change as well as technology implementation as a form of organizational design. She is 
interested in strategizing and upward influencing processes and coordination practices 
between disciplines, across locations and across organizational boundaries. Kristina 
managed applied research projects with several industrial partners in four different Eu-
ropean countries, bridging technical innovation and social science. Kristina published in 
leading innovation and design journals such as Journal of Product Innovation Manage-
ment, Computer Supported Cooperative Work, International Journal of Technology and 
Human Interaction, Design Studies, and Journal of Design Research.
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Hans Berends is Associate Professor of Technology and Innova-
tion at the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, VU 
University Amsterdam. Hans has a background in both philosophy 
and industrial engineering, and received a PhD from Eindhoven 
University of Technology for a dissertation on knowledge sharing 
in industrial research, based on research at Philips Research and 
Shell Global Solutions. Before joining the VU University Amsterdam 
in 2012, he worked as assistant professor and associate professor 
at the Eindhoven University of Technology. In 2011-2012 he was 
a honorary fellow at the University of Liverpool Management School. His work has been 
published in leading journals including Organization Science, Journal of Management 
Studies, Organization Studies, Human Relations, and Journal of Product Innovation 
Management. He was main applicant and project leader of a European research project 
on open innovation, with a total budget of approximately 450,000 euros (Interreg IVC, 
EURIS, BMOI).
Prof.dr. Gerda Gemser
Gerda Gemser is Full Professor of Design and Business  at RMIT 
University of Technology and Design (Melbourne, Australia). She 
is one of the five distinguished full professors appointed by RMIT 
University to stimulate research on design (www.rmit.edu.au/
research/professors-of-design). Her professorship is split across 
the College of Business and the Design Research Institute of 
RMIT. Gerda earned her PhD degree at the Rotterdam School of 
Management. She has held positions at different universities in 
the Netherlands, including Delft University of Technology, and 
Erasmus University (Rotterdam School of Management). She has been a visiting scholar 
at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (US) and University of British Columbia 
(Canada). Gerda has conducted different studies on the effects of design (management) 
on company and project performance in cooperation with the Dutch Government, BNO 
and Premsela). She was actively involved in the development and management of the 
Creative Industry Scientific Program (CRISP), a large-scale research program on design 
product-service systems. She has published in leading management and design journals 
such as Organization Science, Organization Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of 
Product Innovation Management, Design Studies and International Journal of Design.
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